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UNION OF LAW AND EQUITY AND TRIAL BY JURY UNDER THE CODES
It is an interesting speculation whether an able court does not tend
naturally because of its own high level of efficiency to require of others
a greater facility in matters of procedure than may reasonably or prac-
tically be expected. The New York ,Court of Appeals now furnishes
an occasion for such a speculation. That able tribunal has recently gone
far to reEstablish the requirement that the pleader must have and stick
to one theory of his cause of action.- It has stated, in reversing a judg-
ment because of lack of a jury trial, that "the inherent and fundamental
difference between actions at law and suits in equity cannot be ignored,"
coupling with this some encomiums upon the necessity of exact pleading
which have a distinctly antiquarian sound.2  Still more recently it has
expressed "a desire to preserve to litigants the forms of procedure pre-
scribed by law and the rights flowing therefrom." 3 It has made doubt-
ful the former New York law that a plaintiff who sued for specific
performance knowing that he could get only damages, could nevertheless
get the latter,4 for it states that the weight of authority is that "the court
will not retain the action and grant purely legal relief, but will dismiss
the complaint."5 And it has now just held in Syracus.e v. Hogan
'Walrath v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co. (1915) 216 N. Y. 220, n1o N. E. 426; see
also the case in note 3, infra. See criticism of the requirement of a theory of the
pleading and discussion of the former New York rule in Albertsworth, The Theory
of the Pleadings in Code States (1922) 10 CALIF. L. REtV. 202; Whittier, The
Theory of a Pleading (19o8) 8 CoL. L. REv. 523; (1911) 24 HARV. L. REv. 480;
(1918) 32 HARV. L. REV. 66.
'Jackson v. Strong (1917) 222 N. Y. 149, 18 N. E. 512. This was brought as an
action for an accounting between partners but turned out to be merely an action
for breach of contract. For criticism of the case, see NOTES (1918) 32 H-Av. L.
Rtv. 166; Scott, Progress of the Law (11) 33 HARV. L. REv. 236, 240; Alberts-
worth, op. cit. supra note I. In the NoTE first cited it is said that inasmuch as the
defendant admitted his breach of contract there was no question of fact at issue.
It seems, however, that the defendant should be entitled to a jury trial on the issue
of damages. In any event the court did not show itself astute to discover a waiver
of the defendant's right to trial by jury through his failure to assert it seasonably.
'Merry Realty Co. v. Shamokin & Hollis R. E. Co. (1921) 230 N. Y. 316, 13o
N. E. 3o6 (reversing 186 App. Div. 538), action to foreclose a mortgage given on
exchange of real property; counterclaim for rescission of the exchange, return of
the defendant's realty and damages; on the plaintiff's appeal, judgment for the
defendant for money damages for deceit was held error as inconsistent with the
theory of the pleadings; the pleadings were for equitable relief, the judgment was
for legal relief; all the courts who heard the case were convinced of the plaintiff's
gross fraud and deception; justice seems to have been done; and yet a new trial
is necessary to allow full damages only if rescission cannot be had, since the
action is equitable.
'Barlow v. Scott (i861) 24 N. Y. 40.
Jackson v. Strong, szapra note 2. Apparently, however, the court will not go
so far as to dismiss the complaint. In Saperstein v. Mechanics & Farinwrs' Bank
(1920) 228 N. Y. 257, 126 N. E. 708, the court says that if in addition to an
equitable cause of action "the facts as stated give rise to a legal liability then
there should be no dismissal; the action remains to be tried." There is a quite
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(1923) 234 N. Y. 457,8 that in a suit to enjoin one from maintaining a
building and other encroachments on a strip of land, title to which was
claimed by the plaintiff, the defendant who claimed title in himself by
adverse possession is entitled as of right to a trial by jury. Judge
Cardozo dissented in an able opinion, in which judges Pound and Crane
concurred.
It is submitted that in this series of cases the learned court has
approached the problem of the union of equity and law under the codes
from a fundamentally unsound standpoint. It ought not to be true that
actions at law and suits in equity must be considered still inherently
different. It would be a disgrace to our law if the ancient cumbersome
methods of doing justice by two separate systems of law were still neces-
sary. And the experience of enlightened states, such as Connecticut,
shows that it is not necessary. The difficulty is the same as that dis-
cussed in Professor Cook's article earlier herein, 7 namely, the failure to
appreciate that equity and law were not two concurrent systems of law
but were to a large extent two conflicting systems and that the purpose
of the makers of the code seems dearly to have been to end such con-
flict by providing for one system of justice. This system cannot be
called either legal or equitable as these terms were anciently used. It
is a combination of the two, wherein the substantive jural relation
enforced by the court in the first instance is the same as would ultimately
have been preserved under the old system by a roundabout method of a
proceeding in equity to prevent its non-enforcement at law. 8
A large part of the confusion is undoubtedly due to the fact that the
state constitutions preserve inviolate the constitutional right of trial by
jury as existing at the time of their adoption. This adds to the incon-
venience of trial but should do no more. The jury does not determine
the method of procedure except in one part thereof, namely, the ascer-
tainment of the facts. Other parts of a lawsuit, such as the framing
of issues, and proceedings after judgment, may proceed in substantially
the same manner whether a jury trial is had or not.9 Hence the right to a
surprising amount of confusion generally on this point. See ig L. R. A.
(N. s.) 1064, 1075, note. See NoTEs (1916) i6 CoL. L. REv. 326. In the Saper-
stein case the action is said to be "now an action at law"; in McGraw Co. v.
Zanta Tire & Rubber Co. (1922, Iowa) igo N. W. I29, the remedy is said to be
by motion to transfer to the "law calendar"; in Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Walker
(1923, Wash.) 212 Pac. 277, "there came into being by the pleadings of the
parties .... a simple law action" in what had been an action for equitable relief,
or else the defendant lost his right to trial by jury. The continued use of the
term "law" is unfortunate as tending to perpetuate a distinction which no longer
exists.
Reversing (1922) :2o App. Div. 874.
'Cook, Equitable Defenses (1923) 32 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 645.
'See discussion, ibid.
'Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon (1923, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. ii8, discussed by Cook,
op. cit. supra note 7, at p. 656, illustrates a not uncommon distinction still preserved
between equitable and legal causes, namely that the appellate court may review the
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jury trial should mean merely that after the issues have been formed they
should, upon motion of any party, be examined to determine whether,
at the time of the adoption of the constitution, under such issues the
facts had to be ascertained by a jury. Since court and jury trials were
kept separate by the existence of separate tribunals until the adoption
of the codes, our question is substantially therefore an historical one
as to the situation which existed at the time of adoption of the codes.-1
Moreover, the parties should be held to have waived the raising of the
question and their constitutional right by not asserting it seasonably.'"
In the principal case, therefore, where the right was asserted in due
fashion, the question is really whether equity would have tried a disputed
title to land, before the amalgamation of equity and law. The majority
try to dismiss the question more summarily by asserting that the case
comes within the terms of the code action of ejectment where the parties
by the code are entitled to a jury trial, and it is claimed that the plain-
tiff may be given complete relief therein by an award, provided for in
the code, of damages and expenses for removing encroachments?
2
The argument seems to be that although you have tried to bring an
action for "equitable" relief, yet since "legal" relief is sufficient, we
will compress your action into one for "legal" relief. But as Judge
Cardozo clearly demonstrates, the plaintiff in such a case should be given
an injunction compelling the defendant to remove the encroachment or
else the sheriff, acting for the plaintiff, is put in the position of Shylock
limited exactly to his pound of flesh. The better rule, already followed
in New York, gives the owner "the remedy that will place the risk and
the cost upon the shoulders of the wrongdoer."'1 3  Hence the plaintiff
should be held entitled to "equitable" relief.
Now there is a rule of some vogue that equity will not try a disputed
title to realty but will await a decision at law before awarding permanent
facts in the former but not in the latter cases. This is not a necessary rule.
Under the Connecticut procedure findings by court or jury are equally respected.
See Meriden Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Miller (i913) 88 Conn. 157, 90 Atl. 228
(action of interpleader).
" See the admirable Connecticut provision quoted by Cook, op. cit. supra note 7,
at p. 652. The method there set forth was applied in Roy v. Moore (1912) 85
Conn. I59, 82 Atl. 233, a case similar to the principal case.
I Here again the Connecticut provisions seem admirable. In effect they require
a party affirmatively to ask for a jury trial within a certain time or the right is
waived. Conn. Gen. Sts. igi8, sec. 5752. The cumbersome New York provisions
referred to by Cook, op. cit. supra note 7, at' p. 651, require a~firinative action in
order to waive the right. The Connecticut provision is constitutional. Noren v.
Wood (1899) 72 Conn. 96, 43 Atl. 649.
'Code Civ. Proc. sec. 3343, subd. 20; sec. 968, subd. 2; sec. 1496, 1497; sec.
166o-i662; sec. I24o; N. Y. C. P. A. 1920, sec. 7, subd. 8; sec. 425, subd. 2; sec.
920, 504, 505.
"Cardozo, J., dissenting in the principal case; Hahl v. Sugo (igoi) 169 N. Y.
1o9, 62 N. E. 135; City of New York v. Rice (191o) ig N. Y. 124, gi N. E. 283.
See discussion by Professor G. E. Woodbine in COMMENTS (917) 27 YALR LAW
JOURNAL, 265.
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relief. Some courts have thought the rule to be jurisdictional,14 but
equity scholars seem in the main to view it only as a rule of policy,
not of power.' 5 Even so, if the equity court did not actually and in
practice try the title, the defendant now should have his jury trial on
this issue only and such has been the result sometimes reached under
the codes. 6 In some states, however, the entire rule had been repudi-
ated,17 and this, so says Judge Cardozo, was the situation in New York.
The cases seem to bear him out, even though in certain of them the
judges enter a caveat as though they were not entirely sure of their
ground.'8  Nevertheless, there seems to have been clearly sufficient
basis so that a decision refusing a jury trial, a result desirable as avoid-
ing an expensive and inefficient procedure, could not have been con-
sidered as any vital attack upon the ark of the constitution.
Judge Cardozo says: "We have left far in the distance the wasteful
duplication of remedies and trials. We shall set the clock back many
years if we return to it to-day." Perhaps he overstates the case: for
if the jury is to be considered only as one of several bodies available
for determining the facts, as it is, and not as a kind of central pivot
about which the whole case revolves, the only result is to require the
use of this particular body as the fact-finding machinery in this case.'"
"4Hernann v. Mexican Petrolemn Corp. (1915) 85 N. J. Eq. 367, 96 Atl. 492;
Freer v. Davis (19o3) 52 W. Va. I, 43 S. E. 164.
15 1 Ames, Cases in Equity iurisprude;we (19o3) 515; 5 Pomeroy, Equity Ituris-
prudence (2d ed. 1919) 4355, 4356, and cases cited. The entire equitable rule has
been subjected to severe criticism. See William Draper Lewis, Injunctions
Against Nuisances and the Ride Requiring the Plabiiff to Establish his Right at
Law (19o8) 56 U. PA. L. REv. 289; Clark, Equity (1920) sec. 193.
"sSo in Roy v. Moore, snpra note IO, the court found that in Connecticut, on
January I, i88o, the equity court would not have tried the title and hence it
properly concludes that the parties have rights to jury trials. Cases from other
jurisdictions are therein cited.
"Lux v. Haggin (1886) 69 Calif. 255, 284, IO Pac. 674; cf. Ladd v. Osborne
(189o) 79 Iowa, 93, 44 N. W. 245; Pohlnan v. Evangelical Lutheran Trinity
Church (I9OO) 6o Neb. 364, 83 N. W. 2o1; Williams v. Riley (907) 79 Neb. 554,
113 X. 'V. 186. See Lewis, op. oat. spra note 15, at p. 315, upon the rule in
nuisance cases: "But, though we may observe that the rule is dying, it is unfortu-
nately not yet a corpse; and the difficulty is that no lawyer knows when it will be
galvanized into sufficieit life to delay and vex his client's pursuits of justice." In
some jurisdictions the rule is overthrown by statute or rule of court. See Lord
Hale's Act (1862) 25 & :26 Vict. c. 42; Federal Equity Rule No. 23, 226 U. S.
App'x. 6, 33 Sup. Ct. xxiv; cf. Carpenter v. Dennison (1919) 208 Mich. 441, 175
Y . W. 419.
18 See cases cited by Cardozo, J., dissenting, including Hahl v. Sugo, supra note
13; Baron v. Korn (1891) 127 N. Y. 224, 27 N. E. 804; Hinckel v. Stevens
(1897) 17 App. Div. 279, 45 N. Y. Supp. 678, (igoo) 165 -N. Y. I71, 58 N. E. 879;
Olmsted v. Loomis (1854) 9 N. Y. 423. See also Belkuzp v. Trimble (1832,
N. Y.) 3 Paige Ch. 577; Kent, Ch., in Gardner v. Newburgh (1816, N. Y.) 2
Johns. Ch. 162.
"Historically the jury developed as only one of several methods of finding the
facts. In earlier times the court determined the method of trial, whether by ordeal,
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Nevertheless, the decision is unfortunate. Jurists of experience find
little to say in support of the delays, the expense, and the aleatory results
of trial by jury.20 In England it is being more and more restricted.21
Its real advantage seems to be as a kind of safety valve for the judicial
system. It relieves the judges of the burden and the odium of deciding
close questions of fact in cases, such as personal injury actions, where
the feelings of litigants are apt to run high. Surely it is a loss to extend
the field of its application by the application of the constitutional strait-
jacket where not necessary.
C. E. C.
C. I. F. CONTRACTS IN AMERICAN LAW, I
That familiarity which breeds contempt has some points of advantage
over the unfamiliarity which breeds confusion. Until quite recently
c. i. f. contracts have been regarded as "British contracts,"' and left for
full discussion to the British writers.2 But the overseas trade which
compurgation, battle, and so on. Since the jury became increasingly popular tolitigants, the judges of the king's courts saw their opportunity to extend the popu-larity of those courts and increase the king's revenues by making use of this newfact-finding machinery. It is a later development which gave to the jury theunique position it so long occupied in English law. See Bigelow, History ofProcedure (I88O) "The Medial Judgment," 288 et seq.; Thayer, Preliminary
Treatise on Evidence (1898) chs. I &: 2.
"Judge J. C. McWhorter, Abolish the Jury (1923) 29 W. VA. L. QuAR. 97;
Ex-Senator and Judge John D. Works, Juridical Reform (1919) 50."In England, by the Administration of Justice Act, 192o, in any action except
libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction, breach ofpromise of marriage, and certain matrimonial and probate cases, where the court
or judge upon application of a party is "satisfied" that "the action or matter can-not as conveniently be tried with a jury as without," he shall have power "notwith-standing anything in any Act," to order it tried without a jury. (192o) io & II
Geo. V, c. 81, sec. 2; Annual Practice (1923) 2155; Order 36, rules 2-6, AnnualPractice, (1923) 58o-585. This procedure has been objected to by the judges ofthe Court of Appeal in Ford v. Blurton (1922) 38 T. L. R. 8oi, and in variousnotes in (1922) 153 LAW TImEs, 196; (1922) 154 ibid. 37; (1923) 155 ibid. 45,
227, but it seems not undesirable.
See Williston, Sales (19o9) 408; II C. J. 765; (1920) 30 YALE LAW JOURNAL,go. Recently the subject has been receiving attention. Williston, The Progress
of the Law 199-592o, Sales (1921) 34 HARv. L. REV. 741, 75o et seq.; Lucas,Liability uder C. I. F. Contracts (1921) 41 CAN. L. T. 556; Craighill, Sales ofGoods on C. I. F. Terms (1919) 6 VA. L. REv. 229; (1921) 21 COL. L. REv. 724;
(1922) 22 ibid. 6oi; (1920) 20 ibid. Io1; io A. L. R. 7Ol, note; 2o A. L. R. 1236,
note; 7 B. R. C. 956.
- Not that the references in the British writers can always be counted on for
help. See Benjamin, Sales (6th ed. 1920) 8o8 et seq.; Blackburn, Contract ofSale (3d Canadian ed. 191o) 241, note; although there is scattered through each
of these books a great quantity of uncorrelated material on the subject See also
25 Hals. Laws Eng. 211. But Chalmers, Sale of Goods Act (8th ed. 1920) 86-88,
contains an excellent brief discussion; so also Scrutton, Charter Parties (8th ed.
1917) 166-7.
